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Assessing the Silica (Frac) Sand Mining 
Environmental Regulatory Frameworks 
in Minnesota and Wisconsin: Who Has a 




In recent years there has been significant growth of silica 
sand mining in the United States due to increased demand for the 
sand in the hydraulic fracturing (or “fracking”) oil and gas 
extraction industry.3  Minnesota and Wisconsin are home to 
abundant deposits of the specific type of silica sand that is needed 
in the fracking process, yet these silica “frac” sand4 resources are 
not found widely elsewhere in the country—resulting in a localized 
and highly profitable mining boom in the upper Midwest.5 
                                                
1 Minnesota and Wisconsin are often referred to as the “gopher state” and 
“badger state,” respectively, in honor of each state’s population of prolific 
burrowing mammals. 
2 Juris Doctorate Expected May 2015, Hamline University School of Law. I 
thank my wife Beth for her endearing support in all that I do. 
3 See, e.g., Paul Tosto, MPR News Primer: Frac Sand Mining, MINN. PUB. 
RADIO NEWS, http://www.mprnews.org/story/2012/03/08/frac-sand-mining-mpr-
news-primer (Feb. 15, 2013). 
4 Although commonly, and often pejoratively, referred to as “frac sand,” this 
article will use the more diplomatic and scientific term “silica sand.” Frac sand is 
a specific type of silica sand, and most of the health and environmental issues 
associated with silica “frac” sand mining operations are of equal concern for all 
types of silica sand mining. See generally Silica Sand Mining in Wisconsin, WIS. 
DEP’T OF NAT. RES., at 12-32 (Jan. 2012), http://dnr.wi.gov/topic/\Mines/ 
documents/SilicaSandMiningFinal.pdf (discussing the broad range of potential 
environmental impacts associated with sand mining). 
5 See Tosto, supra note 3. As of May 2013, there were seventeen active silica 
sand mines in Minnesota, with an additional twenty-one mines being planned. 
Mapped: More than 20 proposed frac sand facilities, MINN. PUB. RADIO NEWS 
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However, silica sand mining has become a controversial issue in the 
region, with supporters touting economic benefits of industry 
expansion, while local communities are concerned about potential 
health and environmental impacts associated with the mining.6 
Minnesota and Wisconsin state agencies, as well as some 
local governmental units (LGUs) within each state, have long 
regulated sand mining operations. But the accelerated development 
of sand mining sites, the rush of associated economic activity, and 
uncertainty about the potential environmental risks of silica sand 
has generated debate about the proper roles for state and local 
regulators.7  Concerns over regulation include determining whether 
the state or local governments are best suited to oversee mining 
activities; whether sufficient regulatory controls are in place to 
manage the risks of silica sand mining; and whether mining 
operations are being regulated proportionate to the risks, so as to 
not impede beneficial economic development. This debate has 
spurred recent state and local regulatory activity in Minnesota and 
Wisconsin to address the concerns of the various silica sand 
stakeholders—mine developers, state agencies, LGUs, and the 
public.8 
This article sets out to analyze the silica sand mining 
environmental regulatory schemes in Minnesota and Wisconsin to 
determine if this booming industry is met with an appropriate state-
local oversight framework. Part II of this article provides a brief 
explanation of silica sand mining, including a discussion of the 
potential health and environmental risks and economic benefits and 
                                                
(May 1, 2013), http://minnesota.publicradio.org/collections/frac_sand/frac_map/.  
In Wisconsin, silica sand mining and processing operations doubled from 2011 to 
2012. In May 2013, there were 112 permitted and nineteen proposed silica sand 
facilities, including mining, processing, and rail loading sites. Map: Wisconsin’s 
Frac Sand Industry, WISCONSINWATCH.ORG, http://www.wisconsinwatch.org/ 
viz/fracmap/ (May 1, 2013). 
6 See Tosto, supra note 3. 
7 See, e.g., Tony Kennedy, Southeastern Minnesota Asks State for Frac Sand 
Help, STAR TRIBUNE (Feb. 20, 2013, 6:27 AM), http://www.startribune.com/ 
local/191942801.html. 
8 See infra Part IV. 
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concerns associated with silica sand. Part III provides an analysis of 
environmental regulatory theories as applied to silica sand mining, 
with a focus on the state-local regulator dynamic, to determine the 
best regulatory approach for silica sand mining in Minnesota and 
Wisconsin. Part IV assesses the current state-local environmental 
regulatory frameworks in Minnesota and Wisconsin to identify 
aspects that are likely to be effective, as well as opportunities for 
improvement and approaches that may be imprudent. In Part V, this 
article concludes by highlighting the aspects of Minnesota and 
Wisconsin’s regulatory frameworks that are indicative of an 
effective state-local adaptive oversight approach for silica sand 
mining. However, the recent legislative trends in each state indicate 
that Minnesota is on a better path to properly manage the risks and 
benefits of silica sand mining for all stakeholders, whereas 
Wisconsin may be evolving towards a state primacy regulatory 
framework that could result in negative consequences for public 
health and the environment. 
II. DIGGING FOR SAND: WHAT’S THE BIG 
DEAL? 
Silica sand mining, and its connection to oil and gas 
fracking, involve fairly technical industry processes, substantial 
health and environmental risks, and significant economic 
implications. These various aspects intertwine to create a number of 
important and complex public policy issues associated with 
environmental regulation of silica sand mining. Therefore, in order 
to assess the efficacy of the silica sand mining environmental 
oversight frameworks in Minnesota and Wisconsin, it is important 
to first understand how silica sand mining and its associated risks 
and implications operate. The following sections provide 
background information on silica sand mining operations, the 
associated environmental concerns, and the potential economic 
effects of the mining industry. 
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A. Silica (Frac) Sand and the Mining Process 
Silica sand, which is composed of the mineral quartz, has 
historically been mined throughout the country for a variety of 
commercial and industrial uses, such as glass-making and water-
filtration.9 But recently, a certain quality of silica sand is in very 
high demand for a new purpose, as it is a required ingredient in 
fracking10—the controversial oil and gas extraction method 
sweeping the nation.11  In fact, many of the environmental, 
                                                
9 See Silica Sand FAQs, MINN. DEP’T OF NAT. RES. (Mar. 21, 2014), 
http://www.dnr.state.mn.us/lands_minerals/silicasand/faq.html. 
10 Fracking is an enhanced extraction technique used to access oil and gas 
resources (hydrocarbons) that are locked in geologic formations with very low 
permeability, such as shale, from which hydrocarbons cannot be extracted 
through conventional methods. Fracking involves drilling a well vertically and 
horizontally into the hydrocarbon-containing bedrock located thousands of feet 
beneath the ground surface. Then fracking fluid containing water, chemicals, and 
silica sand is pumped into the bedrock at very high pressures to create, expand, 
and prop open fractures, releasing the trapped hydrocarbons. See Energy 
Resources Program: Hydraulic Fracturing Research, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, 
http://energy.usgs.gov/OilGas/UnconventionalOilGas/HydraulicFracturing.aspx#
3892235-overview (last visited Jan. 15, 2014).. 
11 The widespread expansion of fracking throughout the U.S. is a hotly debated 
issue due to the potential significant advantages for national energy and economic 
development versus the high risks to health and environment surrounding the 
drilling sites. See John Ydstie, Will Renewables Suffer Because Of U.S. Oil and 
Gas Boom, NPR (Dec. 27, 2013, 3:24 PM), http://www.npr.org/2013/12/27/ 
257654578/will-renewables-suffer-because-of-u-s-oil-and-gas-boom. The 
potential benefits of expanding oil and gas development include nation-wide 
economic and jobs growth and increased U.S. energy independence promoting 
economic stability and national security. See Jim Efstathiou, Fracking Boom Seen 
Raising Household Incomes by $1,200, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 3, 2013, 11:01 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-04/fracking-boom-seen-raising-
household-incomes-by-1-200.html. Some also argue that a large-scale transition 
from coal- to cleaner natural gas-fired energy production is an important step in 
reducing carbon emissions in the effort to combat climate change. Id. The 
environmental and health risks associated with fracking include impacts to 
surface and groundwater, air quality, and effects on seismic activity. See Natural 
Gas Extraction - Hydraulic Fracturing, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Mar. 14, 
2014), http://www2.epa.gov/hydraulicfracturing. In addition, some argue that 
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economic, and regulatory issues associated with silica sand mining 
and fracking are quite analogous, with support for silica sand 
mining coming directly from the fracking industry and an aspect of 
the opposition to silica sand mining stemming from its very 
connection to fracking.12 
Silica sand is used as a “proppant” during oil and gas well 
fracking activities; the sand is needed to prop open fractures created 
in low-permeability bedrock to facilitate petroleum resource 
extraction.13 The silica sand that is used as a fracking proppant must 
meet specific industry standards with respect to the sand 
composition, shape, size, and compressive strength in order to 
withstand the extremely high-pressure conditions present beneath 
thousands of feet of bedrock.14 Although Minnesota and Wisconsin 
do not have significant petroleum resources to be fracked, they are 
among the few places in the country that have just the right type of 
                                                
expansion of oil and gas drilling will result in continued primary use of climate 
change-inducing fossil fuels over expeditious development of renewable energy 
technology. See Ydstie, supra note 11. 
12 To be clear, although the silica sand mining and hydrocarbon fracking 
industries are related due to the use of silica sand in hydrocarbon fracking 
operations, sand mining and hydrocarbon fracking are two distinct processes and 
industries that occur in different locations, have different environmental impacts, 
and are regulated under different schemes. This article assesses environmental 
regulation of silica sand mining, not hydrocarbon fracking.  A brief discussion of 
the fracking process and national debate regarding the risks and benefits of 
fracking is included in this article to provide the larger context regarding the 
forces that are driving the silica sand industry and regulatory debate.  For in-
depth analyses of fracking environmental regulation, see Emily C. Powers, 
Fracking and Federalism: Support for an Adaptive Approach That Avoids the 
Tragedy of the Regulatory Commons, 19 J.L. & POL'Y 913 (2011); Robert H. 
Freilich & Neil M. Popowitz, Oil and Gas Fracking: State and Federal 
Regulation Does Not Preempt Needed Local Government Regulation, 44 URB. 
LAW. 533 (2012); John R. Nolon & Victoria Polidoro, Hydrofracking: 
Disturbances Both Geological and Political: Who Decides?, 44 URB. LAW. 507 
(2012). 
13 Silica Sand Mining in Wisconsin, supra note 4, at 3. 
14 Id. 
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high-quality and accessible silica sand formations that are sought by 
the fracking industry.15 
The silica sand deposits that are targeted for the most cost-
effective mining are generally located at relatively shallow depths 
(within fifty feet below the ground surface), therefore the typical 
technique to remove the silica sand is strip-mining from large pits 
that are open at the ground surface.16 Explosive blasting in the mine 
pit followed by material crushing are both typically performed to 
remove and break up heavily-cemented sand deposits.17 The sand is 
usually processed at the mine site or at an off-site plant by washing 
and screening to remove unwanted grain sizes.18 In some cases the 
sand is further prepared by coating it with resin to enhance 
performance in the fracking process.19 Chemical additives such as 
polyacrylamide, which can breakdown into a toxic pollutant, are 
usually used during sand processing to aid in separating grain 
sizes.20 The sand is then transported off-site by open- and closed-
topped trucks and railroad cars.21 After sand mining is finished at a 
site, state and local regulators typically require reclamation of the 
mine site to establish safe and usable terrain for an approved post-
mining use.22 
B. The Health and Environmental Risks 
There are various potential impacts to health and the 
environment associated with silica sand mining, processing, and 
transportation activities. There are potential impacts to air quality 
                                                
15 See Tosto, supra note 3. 
16 See Silica Sand Mining in Wisconsin, supra note 4, at 7. 
17 Id. at 7-9. 
18 Id. at 9. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 22-23. 
21 Id. at 10. 
22 See Silica Sand Mining in Wisconsin, supra note 4, at 10-11. Mine site 
reclamation activities generally include grading slopes, adding topsoil, and 
planting vegetation. Former mine sites are reclaimed for uses including wildlife 
habitat, agricultural land, or building sites. 
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due to fugitive silica dust (respirable crystalline silica [RCS]) and 
other particulate matter that is generated throughout the mining 
activities; the RCS becomes airborne and escapes mining and 
processing sites or vehicles during transport.23 RCS is an air 
pollutant of high concern, because there are known health risks 
associated with exposure to high concentrations of RCS in 
occupational settings.24 However, there is little known about the 
level of RCS concentrations and the associated air quality health 
risks to communities that are adjacent to silica sand mining sites 
and transportation routes.25 Therefore, communities in close 
proximity to silica sand mining operations are particularly 
concerned about the potential health impacts of RCS.26 In addition 
to RCS, various hazardous air pollutants are also emitted from the 
heavy equipment used to mine, transport, and process the silica 
sand.27 
There are several potential impacts to water resources 
associated with silica sand mining. Water is used often during the 
mining and processing activities to wash fine particles out of the 
silica sand.28 This process water, in addition to accumulated 
stormwater, is held on-site and discharged off-site.29 There is 
potential for sediment-laden or contaminated water generated at the 
mining or processing site to impact groundwater or surface waters 
                                                
23 Id. at 12. 
24 See Silica (crystalline, respirable) Chronic Toxic Summary, CAL. OFFICE OF 
ENVTL. HEALTH HAZARD ASSESSMENT (Feb. 2005), http://www.oehha.org/air/ 
chronic_rels/pdf/silicacrel_final.pdf (citing numerous studies indicating that RCS 
exposure causes silicosis and other serious chronic diseases to miners and other 
industrial occupations). 
25 See Silica Sand Mining, MINN. POLLUTION CONTROL AGENCY (Nov. 26, 
2013), http://www.pca.state.mn.us/index.php/air/air-quality-and-pollutants/air-
pollutants/silica-sand-mining/index.html [hereinafter MPCA Silica Sand Mining]. 
26 See, e.g., Silica Sand Dust, CONCERNED CHIPPEWA CITIZENS, http://ccc-
wis.com/page8/page8.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2014) (community action 
brochure discussing the health concerns of silica sand dust associated with 
mining activities in the Chippewa Valley region of Wisconsin). 
27 See Silica Sand Mining in Wisconsin, supra note 4, at 12. 
28 Id. at 21. 
29 Id. 
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such as streams and wetlands.30 Further, groundwater is sometimes 
encountered during mining activities and pumped from the mine pit 
to facilitate removal of the silica sand, which can potentially cause 
groundwater and surface water depletion problems in the area.31 
Sand mine development involves removal and disturbance 
of surface soil at the site, which can damage future soil viability at 
the mining site, resulting in unproductive and unhealthy land for 
agricultural or other post-mining uses.32 When the mining 
operations end, mine sites are usually required to be reclaimed to 
remediate damage to the soil and land; however, there is concern 
that current mine reclamation programs do not properly restore soil 
health at former mine sites.33 In addition, if a mine site is not 
reclaimed properly to prevent erosion, open pits, or unstable slopes, 
the former mine area can be hazardous to people who enter the site 
and also be prone to refuse and hazardous material dumping.34 
There are also aesthetic and nuisance-type impacts 
associated with silica sand mining operations that can burden 
nearby residents and users of recreational land adjacent to mining 
operations.35 Ongoing noise and light emanate from mine sites that 
operate long hours, disturbing people and wildlife in proximity to 
the site.36 Scenic bluffs and other landscape features could be 
                                                
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 22. 
32 See Richard Kremer, UW, Chippewa County Will Investigate How Frac Sand 
Mining Affects Soil, WIS. PUB. RADIO (Feb. 5, 2014, 5:00 AM), http://www. 
wpr.org/uw-chippewa-county-will-investigate-how-frac-sand-mining-affects-soil. 
33 Id. (indicating that Wisconsin university and county personnel are studying 
how sand mining activities affects soil health, because little is known about the 
extent of soil damage and repair outcomes associated with sand mining and site 
reclamation activities). 
34 See Alison Dirr, With Frac Sand Boom in Full Swing, Study to Guide Mine 
Reclamation, WISCONSINWATCH.ORG (Feb. 5, 2014), http://www. 
wisconsinwatch.org/2014/02/05/with-frac-sand-boom-in-full-swing-study-to-
guide-mine-reclamation/. 
35 See Silica Sand Mining in Wisconsin, supra note 4, at 30-33. 
36 Id. 
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destroyed by mining activities.37 Additionally, there is often an 
increase in heavy vehicle traffic coming and going from mine sites 
that can create nuisance and safety issues.38 
C. The Economic Potential 
The economic impact of new silica sand mining operations 
on the surrounding communities and the state is also a controversial 
issue, but no doubt there is the potential for substantial financial 
gains associated with the mining expansion. Private property 
owners who sit atop silica sand deposits can obtain large payments 
for selling the mining rights, while the sand mining companies 
stand to make millions from selling the sand when in high demand 
by the fracking industry.39 But more significantly, mining 
supporters point to the widespread and long-term economic benefits 
of growing the silica sand industry. They maintain that silica sand 
mining will create many new high-paying jobs and boost the local 
economy in rural areas where the mining is typically performed and 
where economic stimulus is especially needed.40 Supporters further 
declare that silica sand mining is projected to be sustainable for 
years as fracking expansion continues throughout the county.41 
Additionally, supporters state that the sand resources are unique to 
the region, so the industry cannot be moved out of state.42 
However, others warn that the proposed long-term economic 
benefits of mining have not been born out historically across the 
                                                
37 See Altering Landscapes - Frac-sand mining removes our bluffs, HOUSTON 
CNTY. PROTECTORS, http://www.sandpointtimes.com/environment/landscape.asp 
(last visited Mar. 31, 2014). 
38 See Silica Sand Mining in Wisconsin, supra note 4, at 30. 
39 See Mike Ivey, Wisconsin at 'Global Epicenter' of Frac Sand Mining Industry, 
THE CAP TIMES (Oct. 10, 2013, 8:55 AM), http://host.madison.com/news/ 
local/writers/mike_ivey/wisconsin-at-global-epicenter-of-frac-sand-mining-
industry/article_45690930-3125-11e3-ba86-0019bb2963f4.html#ixzz2qfpz4Kto 
(reporting that silica sand mining is a $1 billion dollar industry in Wisconsin 
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country, and increased mining operations can actually do more 
harm than good regarding the economic prosperity of local 
communities and the state. Mining economies tend to be unstable 
and undergo boom and bust cycles, which can have significant 
negative impacts on small and rural communities.43 In fact, the 
demand for silica sand from Minnesota and Wisconsin has already 
undergone a cycle of waning after the initial substantial growth, 
halting mining activities and leaving those involved in the industry 
with economic uncertainty.44 Property values tend to depress in 
counties that contain mining sites, with decreased property values 
especially common in areas adjacent to mine sites and haul routes.45 
One economic study prepared for Wisconsin town and agricultural 
associations, indicates that job creation associated with expanded 
silica sand mining in west-central Wisconsin is expected to be 
modest, representing only a fraction of one percent of the total 
employment in the region.46 
                                                
43 See generally The Economics of Frac Sand Mining, UNIV. OF WIS. COOP. 
EXTENSION,http://conservationvoters.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/ 
uwex_flyer_on_frac_sand_property_values.pdf?c5398br (last visited Feb. 17, 
2014). The growth and recession of the mining industry is largely driven by 
commodity prices, which can fluctuate rapidly and unpredictably. Labor 
migration is often connected with volatile industries such as mining, resulting in 
population growth and decreases that mirror the ups and downs in demand for 
mined commodities. Rural communities can become dependent on the local 
mining industry and without a well-diversified economy they are particularly at 
risk of high local unemployment and decreases in the tax base when mining 
activities slow. 
44 See Kate Prengaman, Mining Firms Stockpiling Frac Sand Until Price Goes 
Up, LACROSSE TRIBUNE (Dec. 22, 2012, 12:00 AM), http://lacrossetribune.com/ 
news/local/mining-firms-stockpiling-frac-sand-until-price-goes-
up/article_0aaa7294-4c00-11e2-8efb-001a4bcf887a.html; see also Elizabeth 
Baier, Slowing Demand for Frac Sand Changes the Landscape in Southeast 
Minnesota, MINN. PUB. RADIONEWS (Nov. 10, 2013, 7:20 AM),http://www. 
mprnews.org/story/2013/11/11/environment/frac-sand-mine-saratoga. 
45 See The Economics of Frac Sand Mining, supra note 43, at 1. 
46 Thomas M. Power & Donovan S. Power, The Economic Benefits and Costs of 
Frac-Sand Mining in West Central Wisconsin, INST. FOR AGRIC. & TRADE POL’Y, 
at 5 (May 2013), http://www.iatp.org/files/2013_05_30_FracSandMining_f.pdf. 
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III. ASSESSING ENVIRONMENTAL 
REGULATORY THEORIES: WHAT IS THE BEST 
APPROACH FOR SILICA SAND MINING IN 
MINNESOTA AND WISCONSIN? 
Since the rise of modern environmental regulation, legal 
scholars have debated what regulatory schemes are best suited to 
appropriately manage the environmental risks associated with 
various industries, while also being careful not to unnecessarily 
stifle economic growth and productivity. The debate has often 
focused on theories of economic efficiency as a basis for achieving 
the ideal environmental regulatory balance.47 Economic efficiency 
theories dictate that environmental regulation should be only as 
stringent and costly as necessary to prevent environmental impacts 
for which remedial costs are not greater than the economic losses 
resulting from over-regulation.48 
One such economic efficiency theory is the “matching 
principle,” which seeks to identify the best match between a level of 
government—federal, state, or local—and the nature and 
geographic extent of the environmental risks.49 The matching 
principle holds that interaction between an industry and primarily 
one regulating body (or a sole regulator in a strict matching 
approach), rather than overlapping regulatory layers, is preferred for 
some industries because it would result in higher economic 
                                                
47 See Powers, supra note 12, at 934. 
48 Id. at 915-16, 932 (discussing a basis for economic efficiency theories--
regulation is reciprocal: “[b]enefits to industry in the form of less regulation can 
be correlated with costs of protecting public health and the environment from 
harm or increased risk of harm. Thus, the operative inquiry for policymakers 
concerns who should bear the cost of regulation, which can be discussed in terms 
of efficiency or may require reaching normative conclusions about who ought to 
bear the burdens environmental harms present. The idea that harms are reciprocal 
is the building block of arguments that posit that regulation becomes inefficient 
when it is overly cautious and leads to unnecessary costs, as in the form of lost 
jobs.”). 
49 Id. at 935. 
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efficiency for all players.50 The matching principle is usually 
applied to questions of environmental federalism;51 but, the federal-
state dynamic is not at issue while assessing regulatory approaches 
to silica sand mining, as the industry primarily involves 
environmental risks of state and local scale. However, the matching 
theory could be applied as a regulatory approach to silica sand 
mining, because in most circumstances state or local regulation, 
rather than federal, is deemed most appropriate due to the specific 
geographic nature of environmental problems.52 Thus, it is 
worthwhile to apply the matching principle to the state-local 
regulatory dynamic at the heart of silica sand mining in Minnesota 
and Wisconsin, to explore if the state or LGUs alone would be the 
most efficient and effective silica sand regulator. 
To begin, it seems clear that LGUs would not be best suited 
under a strict matching approach as the sole regulators of silica sand 
mining. Minnesota and Wisconsin currently regulate industrial 
impacts to land, air, and water through state-wide regulatory 
schemes that implement at least base-level standards required by 
federal law, as do most states.53 So, transition of all power to LGUs 
to regulate silica sand mining environmental impacts would be a 
dramatic upheaval of established state-led frameworks. In addition, 
numerous independent LGU regulatory jurisdictions would likely 
create drastically different regulatory schemes and requirements 
across the state, leading to inefficiencies and uncertainty for silica 
sand mining stakeholders. 
On the other hand, a scheme in which the state has sole 
regulatory authority over silica sand mining seems more plausible. 
As mentioned above, statewide air and water regulatory programs 
are the norm, and some states also administer specific mining 
oversight programs. The advantages of sole state regulation of silica 
                                                
50 Id. 
51 Id. (the focus of environmental federalism is usually on whether the federal 
government or the states and local governments can best regulate a specific 
industry or environmental issue). 
52 Id. at 935. 
53 See infra Part IV for a more in-depth discussion of the current silica sand 
regulatory frameworks in Minnesota and Wisconsin. 
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sand mining would likely include promoting uniform requirements 
and streamlining regulatory processes.54 However, complete state 
control with no LGU involvement could lead to regulatory gaps 
regarding locale-specific circumstances.55 LGUs are in a better 
position to understand and protect the unique local resources that 
they deem valuable, rather than state regulators, who do not have as 
strong of an incentive as LGUs to ensure that all risks of silica sand 
mining are mitigated.56 
In addition, an exclusively state-led silica sand mining 
regulatory scheme would require a large administrative body with 
numerous personnel in order to provide effective oversight across 
the entire state and of all the various technical aspects involved in 
                                                
54 See Jan G. Laitos & Elizabeth H. Getches, Multi-Layered, and Sequential, 
State and Local Barriers to Extractive Resource Development, 23 VA. ENVTL. 
L.J. 1, 15-16 (2004).  The authors argue that layered state and local resource 
extraction regulations may overlap and create actual or seeming conflicts of law, 
creating confusion for the developer as to what requirements must be followed.  
This often results in the developer making duplicative regulatory efforts or 
spending additional resources to solve the legal confusion. 
55 Cf. Powers, supra note 12, at 935. In the context of environmental regulation 
of the fracking industry, Powers argues that “geographic correlation between 
problems and regulatory authorities should guide any attempts to regulate.” 
Powers continues, “[a] corollary of this argument is that one-size-fits-all federal 
regulations are ineffective due to highly disparate ecological and social 
conditions across the states.” Id. This argument is also convincing when applied 
to the state-LGU relationship regarding silica sand mining, in which one-sized 
state oversight programs may not be responsive enough to address the variety of 
interests of LGUs across the state. 
56 Cf. Laitos & Getches, supra note 54, at 16-17. The authors argue that state and 
local governmental interests often diverge regarding regulation of energy 
resource extractive industries. “States are interested in uniform statewide natural 
resource regulation that will satisfy its citizens' need for clean and efficient 
energy sources. On the other hand, local governments are interested in preserving 
communities not burdened by the environmental and aesthetic social costs of 
resource extractive operations.” This state-local tension dynamic appears 
analogous to the state’s interest in facilitating the larger economic benefits of 
silica sand mining across the state, versus LGU interests in protecting the quality 
of life in its region. 
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mining.57  It is unlikely that such a large and comprehensive state 
agency structure would be flexible enough to adequately address all 
the site-specific issues involved in silica sand mining operations.58 
Whereas, a decentralized regulatory framework, that includes state 
and local roles, offers a more workable and responsive structure 
including personnel closer to and more involved in mining activity 
oversight. Thus, it appears that a strict matching regulatory 
approach, whether led by the state or LGUs, is not a good fit for 
silica sand mining. 
A more recent regulatory theory proposed to best address 
complex environmental problems is “adaptive federalism,” because 
it involves “flexible roles for the three levels of government, based 
on the observation that overlapping jurisdiction provides a system 
of vertical checks and balances.”59 Due to its dynamic and 
                                                
57 For example, the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (WDNR) 
implements a state-wide nonmetallic mine site reclamation program in 
conjunction with the counties. The WDNR oversees the individual county 
reclamation programs and the counties are the direct regulators of mine site 
reclamation in their jurisdictions. If the WDNR were responsible for direct 
oversight of all mine site reclamation across the state, it would need to expand 
greatly to fill the roles currently in place in each county. See Nonmetallic Mining 
Overview, WIS. DEP’T OF NAT. RES., http://dnr.wi.gov/topic/Mines/ 
Nonmetallic.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2014) [hereinafter WDNR Nonmetallic 
Mining Overview]. 
58 Id. The WDNR state-county nonmetallic mine reclamation program again 
serves as a useful illustration. If only the WDNR oversaw mine reclamation 
across the state, it would need personnel with expertise about the various 
geographic regions in Wisconsin (i.e., bluff and river valley lands, central plains, 
and woodlands) and knowledge about the specific characteristics of the locality 
surrounding the mine site, in addition to the ability to expeditiously inspect each 
mine site when necessary.  It seems unlikely that a single state agency would 
have all of these capabilities and execute them efficiently to properly oversee 
numerous mine sites across the state, because it would require a large network of 
uniquely trained personnel.  But rather, the more effective and efficient approach 
would be to task the LGUs across the state with oversight roles that require 
knowledge of and access to local site conditions. 
59 Powers, supra note 12, at 916. The local nature of silica sand mining does not 
require strong direct federal oversight, so this discussion will primarily assess the 
adaptive approach regarding the state-local environmental regulatory 
relationship. Interestingly, Minnesota and Wisconsin are both home charter 
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overlapping nature—which is compared to an “ecologic” system—
the adaptive approach is more likely to create comprehensive 
regulation, filling gaps that may be left under a strict matching 
approach.60 However, the multiple layers of oversight are also more 
likely to create over-regulation and inefficiencies, due to potentially 
redundant requirements and the complexity of navigating multiple 
regulatory channels.61 
The “regulatory commons” theory should also be considered 
when applying a regulatory scheme with overlapping jurisdictions, 
such as the adaptive approach. The regulatory commons theory 
identifies the potential for gaps in protection that arise due to 
“confusion over jurisdictional boundaries . . . even where an 
apparently vigorous overlapping regulatory scheme is in place.”62  
Thus, other scholars have suggested that combining an adaptive 
approach with regulatory commons considerations can create a 
robust and self-checking regulatory framework that provides 
appropriate oversight for complex environmental issues.63 
It appears that an adaptive approach that layers state and 
local regulatory control could also apply well to silica sand mining. 
Under this approach, the state sets uniform baseline regulations to 
protect the land, air, and water resources, promoting the general 
welfare of the state. Uniform state environmental regulations not 
only ensure that at least minimum protective measures are in place 
at each silica sand site, but also foster regulatory certainty for silica 
mining industry stakeholders, which increases wider industry 
economic efficiency. A truly adaptive scheme should also allow 
                                                
states, in which the state constitutions provide LGUs broad authority to regulate 
in furtherance of the general welfare within their jurisdictions. The state-LGU 
power dynamic in home charter states is analogous to the traditional framework 
of United States federalism, and home charter states have localized “federalism” 
debates regarding power relationships between the state and LGUs. 
60 Id. at 936-37. 
61 See Laitos & Getches, supra note 54, at 40 (arguing that environmental 
regulation of resource extraction industries is becoming increasingly local, yet 
state regulation still exists, leading to increased likelihood of over-regulation). 
62 Powers, supra note 12, at 916-17. 
63 Id. at 917. 
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LGUs to set silica sand regulations in addition to or more stringent 
than the state, to protect the general welfare concerns specific to 
that LGU. For example, a LGU may have a strong interest in taking 
special precautions regarding industrial activities near trout streams 
or sensitive groundwater resources, which are valuable recreational, 
economic, and public health resources that the community depends 
on. Yet, LGU regulations must not frustrate the purpose of the 
state’s regulatory framework and should be contained within a 
reasonable scope so as to not create widely inconsistent 
requirements among the various LGUs. 
However, to maximize regulatory effectiveness and 
efficiency over silica sand mining, the regulatory approach should 
go beyond a basic state-local dual authority scheme. A cooperative 
framework that integrates state and LGU regulators would create an 
even more adaptive and responsive system.64 The state and LGUs 
can provide support for each other in ways that address each entities 
regulatory strengths and weaknesses: the state can lend its adept 
technical expertise to LGUs, and LGUs can provide a network of 
local knowledge and proximity to mining sites.65 With the state and 
LGUs working as partner regulators, problems with redundant and 
excessive requirements would be less likely, because the state and 
LGU programs could be more closely integrated, rather than 
separately layered.66 In addition, a state-LGU cooperative 
relationship would be more likely to prevent gaps that arise in the 
regulatory commons context, as the state and LGUs would have 
further refined regulatory roles and knowledge of each other’s 
programs, limiting confusion over jurisdictional authority.67 
                                                
64 Id. at 953-54. The author argues that a regulatory regime that includes 
“responsive interaction” among multiple levels of government can give “states 
and localities a better chance to formulate policies aligned with their resources 
and expertise, leading to increased political accountability, jurisdictional 
confidence, and fewer regulatory commons problems.” 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 937. “[D]espite the potential for jurisdictional confusion that 
overlapping vertical jurisdiction presents, one can conclude that regulatory 
commons problems are more likely to be prevented by clarifying roles and 
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The state-local cooperative approach to regulate silica sand 
mining may sound ideal in theory, but in reality there would no 
doubt be tension over power between the state and LGUs 
throughout the regulatory framework.68 A system of overlapping 
authority will inevitably lead to preemption battles, and when it 
does, state-local law preemption rules would resolve the conflict.69 
In general, state regulation would trump LGU regulation over silica 
sand mining in circumstances when there is direct conflict between 
the rules or if the local law impedes the state’s ability to achieve its 
regulatory objectives. Field preemption issues should not arise, 
because as discussed above, a regulatory scheme in which the state 
occupies the entire field is not appropriate given the primarily local 
environmental impacts of silica sand mining.70 
Developing a silica sand regulatory scheme through the 
cooperative approach would limit conflicts between state and local 
rules, because the state and LGUs would work together to develop 
clearly defined oversight roles and programs. However, if state law 
preempts local authority to regulate a public health or 
environmental issue, the state must provide adequate oversight to 
replace the limit on LGU action. A state law is unreasonable and 
against public policy if it preempts local law and results in under-
protection that the LGU could have otherwise addressed through 
supplemental regulation.71 
                                                
granting a variety of regulators increased responsibility for problems than by 
contracting jurisdiction and reducing available resources.” 
68 See Laitos & Getches, supra note 54, at 12-15. There are many opportunities 
for conflict between state and local regulators who have concurrent authority over 
mining operations, as the state seeks to apply uniform standards while the LGUs 
assert power to regulate within their jurisdiction as they see fit. 
69 Id. at 14-15 (“There are three basic ways a state statute can preempt a county 
ordinance or regulation: (1) by express statutory language; (2) by inferring state 
intent to completely occupy the field; or (3) by operational conflict, where partial 
preemption may occur if the effect of local law would conflict with the 
application of an applicable state statute.”). 
70 See supra Part II.B. 
71 Cf. Freilich & Popowitz, supra note 12, at 535. The authors highlight 
examples of state legislatures preempting LGU authority to regulate 
environmental risks associated with fracking, yet the states do not provide 
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Even if some form of replacement oversight is provided by 
the state to address the LGUs concerns, a bar on LGU authority and 
involvement regarding the more local aspects of silica sand mining 
is not the proper approach. A LGU regulator is empowered by a 
local legislative body that is closer, both physically and interest-
based, to the residents of a community.72 Therefore, the LGU 
regulator should be responsive to specific needs of the community, 
as well as accountable for its oversight actions.73 On the other hand, 
state regulators and the state legislature are further removed from 
the local communities, rendering state law less likely to meet the 
site-specific oversight needs of communities where the silica sand 
mining is occurring. In addition, there seems to be a fundamental 
problem in removing regulatory authority from the LGUs regarding 
land use issues that primarily affect the people within its 
jurisdiction. Limiting LGU authority to oversee silica sand 
operations impedes on its ability to promote the general welfare of 
its community. 
                                                
additional oversight to address the concerns of communities where the oil and gas 
extraction is occurring. The authors deem this method of legislative action to bar 
local supplemental regulation as contrary to public policy. 
72 See Laitos & Getches, supra note 54, at 13-14. The authors argue that modern 
growth of the environmental ethic and increased citizen involvement are leading 
to increased assertion of local control over resource extractive activities, as 
“[l]ocal governments and their regulatory agencies seek to represent the interests 
of their constituents.” 
73 Cf. Freilich & Popowitz, supra note 12, at 535. In the context of fracking 
regulation, the authors argue that it is the proper role of local government to 
ensure adequate health and environmental protection for the community 
surrounding the fracking well, whereas the state has the proper role of regulating 
the on-site drilling and production process. This concept of proper LGU 
responsiveness and accountability for regulating the potential impacts of fracking 
applies equally well to the risks that silica sand mining pose for the surrounding 
community. 
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IV. SILICA SAND MINING REGULATORY 
FRAMEWORKS IN MINNESOTA AND 
WISCONSIN 
A. Federal Regulatory Involvement 
Silica sand mining activities are subject to a number of 
federal environmental protection statutes, such as the Clean Air 
Act, Clean Water Act, Safe Drinking Water Act, and the 
Endangered and Threatened Species Act.74 The states, including 
Minnesota and Wisconsin, administer most of the federal 
environmental requirements that stem from these laws as part of 
their state regulatory programs.75  Yet, there are exceptions in 
which federal agencies actively regulate jointly with the states, such 
as wetlands oversight in Wisconsin by the WDNR and U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers.76  As another example, the federal Mine Safety 
and Health Administration (MSHA) works cooperatively with the 
states to develop and implement on-site mine safety and health 
programs to protect mine workers.77 In addition to jointly regulating 
with states, the federal government always has the power to 
increase its regulatory presence and pursue its own enforcement 
actions regarding federal statutes.78 
The current regulatory structure in which Minnesota and 
Wisconsin state agencies act as the primary regulators to implement 
federal rules applicable to silica sand mining appears to be the best 
arrangement. A framework in which the states administer broad 
land, air, and water protection programs, requiring mining facilities 
to meet state and federal permitting rules, has been in place and 
proven successful for decades in Minnesota and Wisconsin. Many 
                                                
74 Silica Sand Mining in Wisconsin, supra note 4, at 39-40. 
75 See Powers, supra note 12, at 930-31. 
76 See Silica Sand Mining in Wisconsin, supra note 4, at 39-40. 
77 See Silica Sand Mining in Wisconsin, supra note 4, at 39-40; See also MSHA’s 
Statutory Functions, MINE SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN.,http://www.msha.gov/ 
MSHAINFO/MSHAINF1.HTM#.Uz7RPcetonI (last visited Apr. 4, 2014). 
78 See Silica Sand Mining in Wisconsin, supra note 4, at 39-40. 
349 JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW & POLICY Vol. 35.2 
more sand mining sites are being developed in Minnesota and 
Wisconsin in recent years, which may create a greater burden on 
state regulators. However, it appears that the state agencies can 
continue to provide effective oversight without federal involvement, 
as long as the states can keep up with processing and enforcing the 
stream of mining environmental permits. The fact that silica sand 
mining is growing rapidly in relatively few areas around the country 
and the associated environmental issues are local in nature also 
indicates that a limited federal regulatory role seems most 
appropriate. 
B. Minnesota’s Regulatory Framework 
1. The Current Approach and Legislative 
Activity 
In Minnesota, the state and LGUs each have varying degrees 
of regulatory power to oversee silica sand mining sites. LGUs have 
broad authority to plan and site general land use activities, 
including mining, within their jurisdiction through zoning 
ordinances.79 Additionally, LGUs can regulate more specific on-site 
activities with further ordinances focused on facility operations, 
safety requirements, and environmental standards.80 However, as 
silica sand mining activity increased, many LGUs did not have 
specific ordinances to regulate mining activities or the technical 
resources to create and implement effective sand mining oversight 
                                                
79 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 462.357 (West 2014). 
80 Minnesota LGUs are granted this power through state statutory authority to 
regulate for the general welfare or through home rule charter (local constitution) 
general welfare clauses. However, LGUs cannot regulate contrary to state law or 
the Minnesota Constitution. See generally Deborah Dyson, State-local Relations, 
RESEARCH DEP’T. OF THE MINN. HOUSE OF REP’S (Oct. 2010), 
http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/pubs/ss/sslcstrel.pdf; MINN. CONST. art. 
XII, § 4; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 412.221 (West 2013). 
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measures.81  LGUs may implement moratoriums to temporarily 
prohibit silica sand mining activities while the LGU develops 
regulations to address mining operations.82 Moreover, if a LGU 
articulates important public interest justifications, it may completely 
exclude new silica sand mining sites from the jurisdiction through 
ordinance.83 
At the state level, the Minnesota Department of Natural 
Resources (MDNR) and Minnesota Pollution Control Agency 
(MPCA) regulate various aspects of sand and gravel mining 
operations through issuing water, air, and wetland impact permits.84 
Silica sand mining operations are categorized as a nonmetallic 
mining industrial activity, and must follow general permit 
requirements associated with this regulatory category.85 Yet until 
recently there were few state rules that focused directly on potential 
                                                
81 See Tosto, supra note 3 (discussing Minnesota counties and cities that enacted 
moratoriums and new ordinances to address rapidly growing silica sand mining 
development). 
82 For example, the City of Winona, Minnesota adopted a year-long moratorium 
on silica sand operations that was in place through March of 2013.During the 
moratorium, the city conducted a study and ultimately adopted new ordinances to 
address health and environmental concerns associated with existing and future 
silica sand operations. New requirements were created for moisture testing, 
fugitive dust control plans, and facility setback from residences, in addition to 
expanding other conditional use permit zoning requirements for silica sand 
facilities. See Frac Sand Information, CITY OF WINONA, 
http://www.cityofwinona.com/city-services/planning-zoning/frac-sand-
information/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2014). 
83 See, e.g., Elizabeth Bundar, Houston County Could Permanently Ban New 
Frac Sand Mining, MINN. PUB. RADIO NEWS (Jan. 30, 2014), http://www. 
mprnews.org/story/2014/01/30/houston-county-frac-sand-mining-ban. Houston 
County is considering enacting a ban on new silica sand mining operations based 
on concerns that increased truck traffic from mining activities would overwhelm 
the county’s infrastructure and the potential environmental impacts on trout 
streams and other natural features that are critical to the region. 
84 See MPCA Silica Sand Mining, supra note 25. 
85 See Nonmetallic Mining and Associated Activities: Permit MNG490000, 
MINN. POLLUTION CONTROL AGENCY (Mar. 17, 2014), http://www.pca.state. 
mn.us/index.php/water/water-permits-and-rules/water-permits-and-
forms/nonmetallic-mining-and-associated-activities.html. 
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off-site health and environmental impacts that are specific to silica 
sand operations, such as fugitive silica dust emissions.86 In response 
to vocal public concern about the many new silica sand sites 
popping up around the state, the 2013 Minnesota Legislature passed 
new laws to specifically address several health and environmental 
issues associated with silica sand mining.87 
The 2013 laws direct multiple state agencies to develop 
regulations regarding various aspects of silica sand mining and to 
provide LGUs with technical assistance for implementing local 
regulation.88 Importantly, the 2013 laws also allow LGUs to extend 
for one year an interim ordinance or renew an expired ordinance 
prohibiting new or expanded silica sand projects.89 This moratorium 
extension authority gives LGUs additional time to develop their 
own silica sand oversight measures, and take advantage of state 
technical assistance in doing so, before silica sand sites become 
established in their communities that currently have 
underdeveloped sand mining regulatory tools. 
There are a number of provisions in the 2013 silica sand 
laws that direct state agencies to act to facilitate LGU regulation, 
with the Minnesota Environmental Quality Board (EQB) positioned 
as the central body in assisting LGUs to regulate at the local level.90 
By December 2013, the EQB developed a draft version of in-depth 
model standards to aid LGUs in creating individual local silica sand 
                                                
86 See MDH Health Based Guidance - Crystalline Silica, MINN. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH (Mar. 21, 2014), http://www.health.state.mn.us/divs/eh/hazardous/ 
topics/silica/silicaguidance.html. 
87 See State of Minnesota Silica Sand Information, MINN. ENVTL. QUALITY BD., 
http://silicasand.mn.gov/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2014). The package of new silica 
sand laws that were enacted in the 2013 Minnesota legislative session are referred 
to as the “2013 laws” throughout this article. This website was created following 
adoption of the 2013 laws as a one-stop portal to access silica sand mining 
regulatory information from various state agencies. 
88 Id. 
89 2013 Minn. Laws ch. 114, art. 4, § 106. 
90 The EQB is comprised of the Governor’s Office, five citizens, and nine state 
agency leaders to develop policy, long-term planning, and review significant 
project proposals affecting Minnesota’s environment. See MINN. ENVTL. 
QUALITY BD., http://www.eqb.state.mn.us/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2014). 
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mining ordinances.91 The EQB is also tasked to assemble a silica 
sand technical assistance team to help LGUs regarding a wide range 
of regulatory matters upon request.92 In addition, the EQB has 
created and must maintain an online library of local silica sand 
mining ordinances and permits as a resource for all stakeholders.93 
Several provisions of the 2013 silica sand laws require 
various state agencies to adopt new rules regarding silica sand 
mining aspects of particular concern to health and the environment. 
The law directs the MPCA to develop rules for the control of 
particulate emissions in air from silica sand projects.94 The MDNR 
is required to adopt rules pertaining to the reclamation of silica sand 
mines.95 The EQB must implement new heightened environmental 
review requirements for proposed mines.96 The Minnesota 
Department of Health (MDH) was required to adopt an air quality 
health-based value for respirable crystalline silica by January 
2014—the MDH released its health-based value in July 2013.97 
Minnesota state agencies have been actively engaging LGUs 
and the public for input during the new silica sand regulation and 
rule-making process. The EQB, MPCA, and MDNR are in the 
process of creating a joint advisory committee, including 
representation from LGUs, the silica sand industry, and concerned 
citizens, to provide comments to the agencies throughout 
                                                
91 DRAFT Tools to Assist Local Governments in Planning for and Regulating 
Silica Sand Projects, MINN. ENVTL. QUALITY BD. (Dec. 13, 2013), http://www. 
eqb.state.mn.us/documents/Tools%20for%20Local%20Govt%20draft%20DECE
MBER%2013_2013.pdf; see MINN. STAT. § 116C.99 (2013). 
92 MINN. STAT. § 116C.99 (2013). 
93 Id. at § 116C.992; Library of Local Government Ordinances and Permits 
Regulating Silica Sand, MINN. ENVTL. QUALITY BD., 
http://www.eqb.state.mn.us/silicaLibrary.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2014). 
94 2013 Minn. Laws ch. 114, art. 4, § 105. 
95 Id. 
96 Id.; MINN. STAT. § 116C.991 (2013). 
97 See MDH Health Based Guidance - Crystalline Silica, supra note 86; 2013 
Minn. Laws ch. 114, art. 4, § 105 
353 JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW & POLICY Vol. 35.2 
development of the new silica sand rules.98 Prior to proposing any 
new silica sand rules, the MPCA provided a broad initial request for 
public comments in order to get early and extensive public input 
and to allow for potential inclusion of water pollution standards 
related to silica sand projects, going beyond the requirements 
mandated in the 2013 laws.99 
2. Assessing Minnesota’s Regulatory 
Framework 
Minnesota’s state-local regulatory scheme for silica sand 
mining is an adaptive framework that is evolving toward a more 
cooperative regulatory approach. The Minnesota scheme is adaptive 
because it layers state and local regulators, allowing each level of 
government proper authority to oversee activities that it can 
regulate most effectively.100 The state gives Minnesota LGUs 
substantial power to regulate land use in their jurisdictions for the 
                                                
98 See Soliciting Applicants for Joint Silica Sand Advisory Committee, MINN. 
ENVTL. QUALITY BD. (Nov. 14, 2013), 
http://content.govdelivery.com/accounts/MNEQB/bulletins/94e0ac. 
99 See Request for Comments on Planned Amendments to Rule Pertaining to the 
Control of Particulate Emissions and other Pollutants from Silica Sand Projects, 
MINN. POLLUTION CONTROL AGENCY (Jul. 10, 2013), http://www.pca.state. 
mn.us/index.php/view-document.html?gid=19801. 
100 The LGUs are best suited to site and oversee the mining activities in their 
jurisdiction, because LGUs are on the ground and have more intimate knowledge 
of what is happening in the community.  See Freilich & Popowitz, supra note 12, 
at 535 (arguing that it is the proper role for LGUs to protect the “health and 
safety of the community through the use of comprehensive planning and zoning 
tailored to the unique needs of each community”). Whereas the state agencies are 
better equipped to create the technical regulations required to protect against 
health and environmental impacts associated with mining activities, because the 
state often has more resources and a central team of technical experts can more 
efficiently produce general and consistent rules. Cf. Powers, supra note 12, at 967 
(arguing that in the context of fracking, an adaptive regulatory approach would 
allow state and local regulators to focus on roles within their expertise, such as 
the state developing environmental regulations and ensuring compliance with 
federal environmental laws and LGUs using their land use and municipal zoning 
powers). 
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general welfare.101 LGUs can determine if, where, and under what 
conditions silica sand mining activities can be performed in their 
communities through zoning and other ordinances.102 This allows 
LGUs to control burgeoning development of sand mining in the 
manner to best promote the specific economic and environmental 
interests of their residents. LGUs can choose to be more 
accommodating to silica sand development or they can choose to 
closely limit or outright exclude sand mining in line with the 
community’s economic and land use planning ideals. 
Underneath the layer of strong local oversight authority, the 
state administers broad environmental regulatory permitting 
programs through the EQB, MPCA, and MDNR. State 
implemented land, air, and water programs provide a base-level of 
consistent standards to be followed by all stakeholders across the 
state. Some Minnesota LGUs do not currently have well-developed 
regulations to address silica sand mining, so the robust state 
environmental programs are critical to provide at least a minimum 
level of oversight protection for mining sites and surrounding 
communities. 
In response to public concern that silica sand mining was 
under-regulated in communities across Minnesota, the 2013 
legislature swiftly enacted a package of new laws that not only 
direct state agencies to create additional rules where gaps existed, 
but also direct agencies to assist LGUs in strengthening local 
regulation.103 The 2013 laws allow LGUs to extend moratoriums to 
provide adequate time to develop well-conceived ordinances to 
regulate silica sand mining in their jurisdiction. The release of time 
pressure and availability of state technical assistance should allow 
                                                
101 See supra Part IV.B.1. 
102 See supra Part IV.B.1. 
103 For example, the MPCA and MDH created silica dust air emissions 
management rules and a health impact standard to specifically address the public 
concern of respirable crystalline silica hazards from silica sand mining sites. The 
EQB, with LGU input, created a model ordinance for LGUs to use in drafting 
their own silica sand regulations and an EQB technical advisory team is available 
for LGUs to consult regarding various silica sand regulatory issues. See supra 
Part IV.B.1. 
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LGUs to create effective silica sand oversight programs to properly 
protect the community and efficiently process mining site 
permits.104 
Under the 2013 laws, state agencies are required to work 
with and seek LGU input during many of the newly directed 
regulatory actions.105 In addition to LGU input, Minnesota state 
agencies are also actively involving the public and industry players 
on a joint advisory committee that will help guide the agencies 
through the new silica sand rule-making process.106  The state is 
also taking actions to aid and increase regulatory efficiency for all 
stakeholders by maintaining an online LGU silica sand ordinance 
and permit library.107 
The 2013 laws seem to be stimulating regulatory teamwork 
between the state and LGUs over silica sand mining. By working 
with the state, LGUs are better able to craft local ordinances that 
complement existing state regulator efforts, so the local regulation 
can focus on the specific issues that need strengthening in their 
jurisdiction and avoid creating redundancies. The State of 
Minnesota and LGUs are also seeking input from community and 
industry interest groups while developing the new silica sand 
regulations in an effort create a regulatory scheme that works for all 
stakeholders.108 These examples of teamwork throughout the silica 
sand regulatory framework should lead to more effective oversight, 
greater budget and time efficiencies, and fewer costly disputes for 
regulators, industry, and the public. 
                                                
104 See Laitos & Getches, supra note 54, at 40. The authors argue that the 
increasingly local regulation of mineral extraction activities can lead to 
unnecessarily burdensome oversight throughout the duration of the project, if the 
LGU “micro-manages” the project without clearly set out standards. Thus, both 
the developer and LGU can benefit from “an up-front, one-stop, pre-permitting 
system to [provide the developer certainty and consistency regarding the 
requirements and] avoid repeated and costly regulatory challenges by the 
developer [against the LGU].” 
105 See supra Part IV.B.1. 
106 See supra Part IV.B.1. 
107 See supra Part IV.B.1. 
108 See Soliciting Applicants for Joint Silica Sand Advisory Committee, supra 
note 90. 
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Although there are many positive signs that state and local 
regulators are working together in an adaptive regulatory approach 
to silica sand mining, there are still greater opportunities for the 
state and LGUs to actively cooperate to further improve the overall 
regulatory framework. The state and LGUs could integrate aspects 
of their regulatory programs or create a hierarchy structure109 to 
increase efficiency and reduce costs. Minnesota could adapt a 
framework similar to Wisconsin’s state-county mine site 
reclamation program110 for its new MPCA silica sand air quality 
monitoring program and MDNR nonmetallic mine reclamation 
program directed under the 2013 laws. Regulatory programs that 
integrate state and local staff, or implement a hierarchy of state and 
LGU agency responsibilities, can better utilize the strongest skills 
of regulatory personnel and the geographic network currently in 
place across the state.111 
The EQB has taken an important step to increase shared 
electronic data practices between agencies by creating an online 
library of LGU silica sand ordinances and permits as a resource for 
stakeholders. However, this concept can be taken further to create a 
comprehensive regulatory portal that provides all of the applicable 
state and local regulations, guidance documents, and permits based 
on the specific location and characteristics of the mine site. This 
online portal could also provide public information regarding each 
mine site across the State, ideally in the form of an interactive map, 
for reference by the community and other stakeholders.112 
                                                
109 For example, state regulators could oversee LGU regulatory programs, and 
the LGU regulators would provide the direct oversight for mining activities--like 
the WDNR nonmetallic mining reclamation program hierarchy framework. See 
WDNR Nonmetallic Mining Overview, supra note 57; see also infra Part IV.C.2 
for a more detailed description of the WDNR nonmetallic mining reclamation 
program. 
110 Id. 
111 See supra note 100. 
112 The MPCA operates an online mapping application titled “What’s in my 
neighborhood?” (WIMN) that provides information about MPCA-regulated sites 
such as site characteristics, operating and environmental permits, permit 
violations, and environmental monitoring. See What’s in My Neighborhood, 
MINN. POLLUTION CONTROL AGENCY (Jan. 30, 2014), 
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C. Wisconsin’s Regulatory Framework 
1. The Current Approach and Legislative 
Activity 
Wisconsin, like Minnesota, is a municipal home rule state. 
Thus, Wisconsin LGUs have wide authority to regulate silica sand 
mining through various land use activity controls, such as zoning, 
site operation, and environmental ordinances.113 However, many 
Wisconsin towns have not enacted a zoning ordinance or they must 
obtain county board approval in order to change their zoning 
ordinance.114 Thus, many Wisconsin towns completely lack the 
zoning oversight power, or are under county control, to regulate 
mine site and operating conditions within their community.115 But 
in a recent Wisconsin Supreme Court decision, Zwiefelhofer v. 
Town of Cooks Valley, towns were provided greater autonomous 
regulatory power over sand mining.116 The court held that a town 
                                                
http://www.pca.state.mn.us/index.php/data/wimn-whats-in-my-
neighborhood/whats-in-my-neighborhood.htmlWIMN. WIMN is a useful tool, 
but it should be expanded, or a new comprehensive silica sand mining mapping 
database should be developed to include LGU and other state agency (i.e., 
MDNR) regulatory information. This compilation of silica sand site and 
regulatory information would be especially useful within an interactive map 
format to aid regulators in assessing cumulative effects of mine sites in a specific 
area and to offer more transparency to the public regarding mine site locations 
and operations. 
113 The Wisconsin Constitution grants municipal home rule authority, which 
provides cities and villages the power to determine their local affairs and 
government without interference from the state legislature. The municipal home 
rule power is only limited by other provisions of the Wisconsin Constitution and 
legislative enactments of statewide concern that uniformly affect every city and 
village. See Rick Champagne, Municipal Home Rule, WIS. LEGIS. REFERENCE 
BUREAU (Jul. 2004), http://legis.wisconsin.gov/lrb/pubs/consthi/ 
04consthiiv3.htm; WIS. CONST. art. XI, § 3. 
114 See Jason Stein, Frac Sand Bill Won't be Taken Up Until Spring, Assembly 
Speaker Says, JOURNAL SENTINEL (Oct. 22, 2013),,http://www.jsonline.com/ 
blogs/news/228816481.html. 
115 Id. 
116 Zwiefelhofer v. Town of Cooks Valley, 809 N.W.2d 362 (Wis. 2012). 
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ordinance regulating nonmetallic mining was validly enacted under 
its police power, and the town’s mining ordinance did not require 
county board approval because it was not a zoning ordinance.117 
In addition to police power oversight authority, towns and 
counties may implement moratoriums to temporarily prohibit silica 
sand mining activities.118 LGUs may also enact complete bans on 
new mining operations within their jurisdiction if it reasonably 
promotes the general welfare.119 However, Wisconsin recently 
passed a law that puts in place heightened requirements for LGUs 
to enact moratoriums, such as obtaining a written report from a 
certified engineer or health professional to document that a 
moratorium is essential in addressing public safety concerns.120 
In contrast to the generally broad LGU regulatory power in 
Wisconsin, there is a bill currently moving through the Wisconsin 
Legislature, Senate Bill (SB) 349, that seeks to significantly limit 
both LGU and state regulatory power over silica sand mining.121 SB 
                                                
117 Id. at 378-79. 
118 For example in September 2013, Trempealeau County enacted a one-year 
moratorium on new or expansion of silica sand mines to allow county supervisors 
to study potential health impacts of silica sand mining. See Richard Kremer, 
Company Skirts Trempealeau County Frac Sand Mining Ban, WIS. PUB. RADIO 
(Nov. 5, 2013, 4:06 PM), http://www.wpr.org/company-skirts-trempealeau-
county-frac-sand-mining-ban. 
119 See, e.g., PEPIN CNTY., WIS. CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 28 (2013), 
http://newords.municode.com/readordinance.aspx?ordinanceid=598774&datasou
rce=ordbank. In June 2013, Pepin County enacted an ordinance that prohibited 
silica sand mining in a designated area along the Mississippi River in order to 
protect the region’s character and tourism economy. 
120 WIS. STAT. § 66.1002 (2013). 
121 See Steven Verburg, Far-reaching bill stirs conflict over who should—and 
can—monitor mining, CHIPPEWA HERALD (Oct. 27, 2013), http://chippewa. 
com/dunnconnect/news/local/far-reaching-bill-stirs-conflict-over-who-should-
and-can/article_f9eb34f4-3e64-11e3-a4c8-001a4bcf887a.html (“The sweeping 
sand mining bill [SB 349] is in part a response to [the] 2012 [Town of Cooks 
Valley] decision that said towns could regulate sand mines using their ordinary 
police powers, rather than through zoning ordinances. That was a significant shift 
because many towns do not have zoning authority, and those that do generally 
need the approval of their county boards to make zoning changes.”).; S.B. 349, 
2013-2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2014). 
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349 limits LGU regulatory authority over sand mining to only 
zoning and mine reclamation ordinance powers—removing LGU 
authority to oversee many on-site mining activities and associated 
environmental impacts.122 The bill also restricts LGU regulation of 
non-conforming land uses, protecting mining sites that were legally 
operating before the LGU determined that mining was not an 
appropriate land use in that area.123 In addition, and likely the most 
substantial regulatory limitation, SB 349 prohibits LGUs and state 
agencies from promulgating air and water regulations that are more 
stringent than the minimum standards set out in current state law, 
requiring state legislative action to increase silica sand mining 
oversight standards.124 
At the state level, the Wisconsin Department of Natural 
Resources (WDNR) is the primary state agency that regulates silica 
sand mining activities through the WDNR’s nonmetallic mining 
program, water program, and air program.125 Due to high interest 
from various stakeholders surrounding the rapid expansion of sand 
mining in Wisconsin, in January 2012, the WDNR published a 
report that assessed the environmental risks associated with silica 
sand mining and the regulatory framework in place to manage the 
risks.126 The report concluded that Wisconsin’s current state-local 
regulatory framework adequately protects against potential impacts 
to public health and the environment associated with silica sand 
mining.127 No new state laws or WDNR rules have been adopted 
that specifically regulate silica sand mining in Wisconsin. 
The main focus of the WDNR nonmetallic mining program 
is to administer the state-wide mine site reclamation program, in 
which the WDNR oversees counties as they implement local 
                                                
122 S.B. 349, 2013-2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2014). 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
125 See Silica (Frac) Sand Mining, WIS. DEP’T OF NATURAL RES., 
http://dnr.wi.gov/topic/Mines/Silica.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2014). 
126 Silica Sand Mining in Wisconsin, supra note 4. 
127 The report also stated that “[a]s the number of sand mines and processing 
facilities increase, especially if clusters of these facilities begin to occur, the 
[WDNR] may consider examining cumulative environmental impacts.” Id. at 41. 
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mining reclamation programs that must meet WDNR 
requirements.128 Counties that implement local mining reclamation 
programs are deemed regulatory authorities (RAs), and the RAs 
regulate silica mining operations by issuing reclamation permits 
that require conformance to approved reclamation plans.129 Mine 
site reclamation plans must include procedures to manage 
environmental impacts, properly restore the site following mining, 
and bond posting to ensure funding for site reclamation activities 
prior to commencing mining.130 Mine sites located in LGUs that 
have not implemented a local mine reclamation program are 
regulated directly by the WDNR.131 The RAs are the direct 
regulators of mine site reclamation, but the WDNR is available to 
provide technical assistance to RAs on reclamation issues.132 In 
addition, the Nonmetallic Mining Advisory Committee, consisting 
of representation from industry, scientific, and community 
stakeholders, advises the WDNR on administering the state-wide 
nonmetallic mining reclamation program.133 
The WDNR regulates potential impacts to surface waters 
and groundwater that may result from silica sand operations 
through various statutes and WDNR water program 
requirements.134 The state also directs counties to regulate potential 
water quality impacts to shoreland surface waters through zoning 
ordinances, in which there are statutory minimum standards that 
LGUs must enforce.135 Many counties have adopted tighter 
standards that go beyond the state minimum standards.136 
                                                
128 See WDNR Nonmetallic Mining Overview, supra note 57. 
129 See Information for Regulatory Authorities, WIS. DEP’T OF NAT. RES., 
http://dnr.wi.gov/topic/Mines/RA.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2014); WIS. ADMIN. 
CODE NR § 135.32 (2013). 
130 WIS. ADMIN. CODE NR § 135.32 (2013). 
131 See Information for Regulatory Authorities, supra note 129; WIS. ADMIN. 
CODE NR § 135.32 (2013). 
132 See Information for Regulatory Authorities, supra note 129. 
133 See Wisconsin Nonmetallic Mining Advisory Committee, WIS. DEP’T OF NAT. 
RES., http://dnr.wi.gov/topic/Mines/Advisors.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2014). 
134 See Silica Sand Mining in Wisconsin, supra note 4, at 36-38. 
135 Id. at 35; WIS. ADMIN. CODE NR § 115 (2013). 
136 See Silica Sand Mining in Wisconsin, supra note 4, at 35. 
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The WDNR regulates potential impacts to air quality that 
may result from silica sand operations through various statutes and 
WDNR air program requirements.137 The WDNR does not 
specifically regulate respirable crystalline silica, which is currently 
an air emission contaminant of significant concern to the public.138 
However, the WDNR requires silica sand operations to implement a 
comprehensive, site specific fugitive dust control plan to eliminate 
or reduce all sizes of dust emissions.139 The WDNR also requires 
large mining operations (production averaging more than 2,000 tons 
per month) to install and operate ambient air monitors to 
continuously monitor particulate pollution, in connection with 
United States Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA) air 
monitoring network requirements.140 
2. Assessing Wisconsin’s Regulatory 
Framework 
Wisconsin’s current silica sand mining regulatory scheme 
appears to be an adaptive approach with effective state and local 
oversight layers. LGUs have wide authority to regulate mine siting 
and on-site operations as needed to protect health, environment, and 
the general welfare within their jurisdiction.141 Wisconsin counties 
administer mine site reclamation and shoreland protection programs 
that must meet state minimum standards; however, the counties can 
include additional standards in their site reclamation and shoreland 
programs to protect its communities’ unique concerns.142 In 
addition, the Zwiefelhofer decision asserted that Wisconsin towns 
have separate authority, not limited by county control, to adopt non-
                                                
137 Id. at 36. 
138 See Respirable Crystalline Silica from Sand Mining, WIS. DEP’T OF HEALTH 
SERV. (Oct. 5, 2012), http://www.dhs.wisconsin.gov/eh/Air/fs/RCS.htm. 
139 Id.; WIS. ADMIN. CODE NR § 415.075 (2013). 
140 Kristin Hart, Air Pollution Control Requirements for Industrial Sand Mines, 
WIS. DEP’T OF NAT. RES., at 3 (June 8, 2012), http://dnr.wi.gov/files/pdf/pubs/am/ 
am491.pdf. 
141 See supra Part IV.C.1. 
142 See supra Part IV.C.1. 
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zoning mining ordinances to further protect the towns’ specific 
interests.143 
The linked oversight layers of the Wisconsin nonmetallic 
mining reclamation program, in which the state oversees county 
programs and the counties (and sometimes towns and cities) 
oversee the individual mine sites,144 promotes regulatory 
effectiveness and efficiency. This hierarchical framework 
establishes clear state and local regulator roles to prevent redundant 
regulation, matches appropriate regulatory workloads for the state 
and LGUs, and prevents oversight gaps with dual regulator layers. 
The local county and towns are best suited to implement the 
specific reclamation plans and mining ordinances at the mine site 
level, due to the LGU’s proximity to and knowledge of land use and 
economic goals in its jurisdiction. The WDNR, on the other hand, is 
better suited as an administrator of the state-wide reclamation 
program, to ensure that the counties are implementing at least 
consistent base standards and a proper overall reclamation program. 
The WDNR mining reclamation program is characteristic of 
an integrated and cooperative regulatory framework for silica sand 
mining. The separately operating but connected, state and county 
reclamation programs work together to reduce regulatory gaps and 
increase efficiency.145 The WDNR provides technical assistance to 
counties regarding mine site reclamation issues,146 so the state and 
county staff also directly work together to strengthen the local 
programs. In addition, the WDNR involves input from industry, 
scientific, and community stakeholders through the Nonmetallic 
Mining Advisory Committee to guide the reclamation program at 
the state level.147 
However, the recent Wisconsin legislative activity, which 
has restricted LGU moratorium powers148 and seeks to significantly 
reduce state and local authority to strengthen nonmetallic mining 
                                                
143 Zwiefelhofer, 809 N.W.2d 362. 
144 See supra Part IV.C.1. 
145 See supra Part IV.C.1. 
146 See supra Part IV.C.1. 
147 See supra Part IV.C.1. 
148 WIS. STAT. § 66.1002 (2013). 
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oversight,149 are steps taken in the wrong direction to limit state and 
local silica sand regulation. Deference should be given to the LGU 
moratorium authority, as a local legislative act, without the need for 
LGUs to produce extensive findings to justify the moratorium 
decision.  This law fundamentally changes the LGU use of 
moratoriums as a legislative land-use planning tool. The traditional 
purpose of the moratorium is to halt land use activities with poorly 
understood consequences, while the LGU assesses the adequacy of 
the regulatory scheme to protect against risks associated with the 
land use. It is proper to require the LGU to provide rational public 
interest reasons for a moratorium, but if LGUs must conduct a 
technical study in order to provide enough evidence to support a 
moratorium (and such a study might be a high financial burden on 
many small towns), the suspect land use and potential for harm 
continues while the LGU begins its assessment, negating the 
protective purpose of the moratorium. 
Removing oversight power from LGUs in combination with 
restrictions on the WDNR to prevent additional mining regulations, 
as set out in SB 349, is likely to result in under-protection of the 
health and environmental risks associated with silica sand mining. 
If LGUs do not have authority to regulate certain aspects of mine 
site operations, then the state will need to fill in the regulatory gaps. 
However, the WDNR is ill equipped to provide local and suitably 
responsive oversight at each of the more than one hundred silica 
sand mining sites across the state. The WDNR would need to 
substantially increase its staff and network to meet the specific 
silica sand oversight needs of each LGU, which is unlikely to occur 
due to budget issues and the apparent injudiciousness of such an 
approach. 
SB 349 would change the Wisconsin silica sand regulatory 
scheme from the current state-local adaptive cooperative approach 
to a scheme with more state regulatory primacy, yet the bill 
simultaneously prevents the WDNR from increasing regulatory 
standards without a change in state laws. If SB 349 is adopted, it 
will likely lead to even stronger public concern and opposition to 
                                                
149 S.B. 349, 2013-2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2013). 
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silica sand mining, which may have unintended consequences that 
undermine the goals of the bill to deregulate and promote silica 
sand mining industry expansion.150 Intense public opposition could 
lead to more moratoriums and complete bans on silica sand mining 
in LGUs across Wisconsin, because once SB 349 removes 
substantial LGU authority, the counties and towns are only left with 
these more drastic regulatory options. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The silica sand mining boom in Minnesota and Wisconsin 
has aroused much debate over the potential economic benefits and 
environmental risks connected with the mining activities. The 
debate has largely focused on determining the proper state and local 
regulatory controls and overall framework to adequately protect 
against health and environmental impacts while also avoiding 
undue regulatory burdens that hinder economic development. It 
appears that a state primacy regulator approach with limited LGU 
involvement is poorly suited to provide efficient regulatory 
processing and comprehensive environmental protection for silica 
sand mining activities, due to the local geographic nature, yet wide 
dispersion of mine sites across the state.151 Instead, an adaptive 
regulatory approach that integrates state and local oversight 
                                                
150 Cf. Powers, supra note 12, at 915 (arguing that New York’s state law primacy 
regulatory approach to fracking, in which the federal government has no 
significant oversight role, has led to intense public opposition to the fracking 
industry that may result in underdevelopment of natural gas resources due to the 
influence of public criticism on regulators). The adoption of SB 349 could lead to 
similar results regarding silica sand mining development in Wisconsin, as the bill 
seeks to confine regulation of nonmetallic mining to a state primacy approach by 
limiting LGU authority. Yet, to head off the potential for state and local regulator 
reaction based on public opposition to silica sand mining, the bill prohibits state 
agencies and LGUs from making more stringent environmental regulations than 
are currently set as base standards. However, one might predict that the boldness 
of SB 349 in removing LGU authority and at the same time limiting state 
oversight power may lead to public backlash that will negatively impact the silica 
sand industry. 
151 See supra Part III. 
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authority and promotes cooperative functioning between the state 
and local regulators creates thorough environmental controls and 
promotes regulatory efficiency over silica sand mining.152 The 
adaptive cooperative scheme combines the responsive capabilities 
of LGUs with the technical expertise, uniformity, and 
organizational resources of state regulators. This results in a flexible 
state-local regulatory framework that better meets the specific needs 
of the communities adjacent to the mining activities and streamlines 
regulatory actions. 
Several aspects of Minnesota and Wisconsin’s silica sand 
regulatory frameworks meld to create effective state-local adaptive 
approaches in each state, including: broad LGU authority to 
regulate land use to promote its communities’ best interests; state 
enforcement of base-level uniform environmental standards; state 
regulators providing technical assistance to local regulators; state-
local regulator teamwork to strengthen local regulation (Minnesota) 
and implement oversight programs (Wisconsin); and state agencies 
inviting stakeholder input to guide regulatory changes.153 These 
examples of state and local dual-layer authority and teamwork 
should create confidence in all stakeholders that silica sand mining 
is being properly regulated to protect environmental and economic 
interests in Minnesota and Wisconsin. 
However, Minnesota and Wisconsin diverge regarding the 
nature of recent legislative activity associated with silica sand 
mining in each state. In 2013, Minnesota enacted laws that create 
additional state oversight programs to address public concerns and 
facilitate a more cooperative state-local regulatory approach to 
silica sand mining.154 Wisconsin, on the other hand, has recently 
legislated heightened burdens on LGUs to control silica sand 
mining and a bill is currently under consideration that would 
significantly limit local and state authority to regulate sand mining 
while also transitioning to a state primacy regulatory scheme.155 
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Thus, it seems that Minnesota is taking steps in the right direction 
to develop a highly effective state-local regulatory framework that 
meets the needs for all stakeholders.156 But Wisconsin is treading 
on shaky ground that threatens to erode its strongly adaptive silica 
sand regulatory scheme, which may well lead to negative results for 
industry, public health, and the environment.157 
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